IMPORTANCE Inadequate privacy disclosures have repeatedly been identified by cross-sectional surveys of health applications (apps), including apps for mental health and behavior change.
Introduction
While the potential of smartphone applications (apps) to improve access to health care resources, 1 real-time monitoring, 2 and even interventions is well established, 3 concerns about data privacy remain. 4, 5 The 2015 closure of the UK National Health Service's Apps Library following discovery that endorsed health apps did not adequately disclose use of, or protect content of, personal data 6 underscores the primacy of privacy for health care apps. The more recent 2018 US congressional investigation into Facebook allowing Cambridge Analytica access to personal data from more than 50 million Facebook profiles after some users completed an online personality quiz has brought further attention to digital health care privacy. 7 The introduction of the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation in 2018 is stimulating renewed interest in the scope of privacy and data protection, 8, 9 both for online services and health care organizations that operate internationally.
This tension between personal privacy and data capture by health care apps is largely driven by the business models of these apps. Because many national health payers and insurance companies
do not yet cover apps (given their often nascent evidence base), selling either subscriptions or users' personal data is often the only path toward sustainability. 10 A recent review of apps for dementia care found that only 4% offered written assurances that user data would not be sold. 11 These numbers were only slightly better for diabetes apps, with 22% promising not to sell user data. 12 Many health care apps label themselves as wellness tools in their privacy policies or terms and conditions in an attempt to circumvent legislation that mandates privacy protections for user data, such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. 13 Responding to the need to ensure health care apps adequately protect users' privacy and to close loopholes that have created the current culture of nontransparent and insecure apps, organizations around the world are now promoting health care app privacy and security. The US Food and Drug Administration, 14, 15 UK National Health Service, 16 Australian Government, 17 and World Health Organization 18 have each identified and begun working on efforts to make digital health tools like smartphone apps more private and secure. Clinician-led efforts by the American Medical Association 19 and American Psychiatric Association 20 to create specific guidelines for health care smartphone apps each place privacy as a central and critical feature that must be evaluated.
However, the evaluation of the privacy (and security) of health care apps remains a challenge.
Inspection of app privacy policies has proven valuable in highlighting potential risks, such as whether users are offered routes to edit, amend, and delete personal data, 6, 11, 21 including within apps that target depression. 22 However, technical assessment that includes the interception of traffic generated by apps holds the potential to uncover issues not apparent on examination of policy text alone. 6 In this study, we aimed to provide a contemporary assessment of the privacy practices of popular mental health apps and, specifically, the correspondence between disclosures made in privacy policies and data actually transmitted to third parties. Following the pattern of previous work 23 assessing the quality of apps, we focused on a sample of mental health apps, selecting apps for depression, a prevalent condition 24 with substantial morbidity, 25 and smoking cessation, an example of mental health-related behavior change relevant to the large numbers of adults who continue to smoke.
Methods
To constitute the set of apps to be evaluated, 2 of us (J.T. and K.H.) searched the official Android and iOS app marketplaces in the United States and Australia using the terms "depression" and "smoking cessation." The search of US app stores took place on January 14, 2018; the search of Australian stores, January 15, 2018. We used search rank as a proxy for popularity, following practices adopted by prior app research studies. 23, 26 To minimize the risk of user-specific tailoring of search results, 27 we ran searches from an anonymized user account with no prior credentials registered at each How long data will be retained 8 (32) Inherent risks or limitations of security using public internet 10 (40) How cookies will be used 16 (64)
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Procedures for opting out of online data sharing 13 (52)
Consequences of not providing or sharing data 9 (36) Procedures for subject access requests 10 (40) Procedures for editing data held by developers or third parties 10 ( running Android version 7.1.2 and iPhone 6S running iOS version 11.0.1), and subjected to 2 sessions of simulated use intended to exercise the set of features available in each app. All network traffic generated during simulated use, including data encrypted using standard internet protocols (eg, Secure Sockets Layer and Transport Layer Security), was silently intercepted using a previously described method 6 based on a technical strategy termed a man-in-the-middle attack. 31 The destination and content of each transmission were tagged automatically to identify (1) the owner of the destination, whether developer or third party and (2) instances of personal and other usergenerated data contained within each message. All tagging was verified manually (by K.H. and M.E.L.). In a post hoc analysis, apps installed on each platform were reviewed to identify those implementing social login functions. Social login is a convenience strategy that allows users to register for internet services by reusing the username, password, and other identity details held by a third party, such as Facebook or Google.
Data were summarized using descriptive statistics. The unit of analysis was the platformindependent app. Because this study did not involve human participants, ethical review was not required according to the policies of the human research ethics procedure of UNSW Sydney. The
Strengthening the Reporting of Observational Studies in Epidemiology (STROBE) reporting guideline was used in the reporting of this observational study.
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Results
More than two-thirds (25 of 36 [69%]) of apps incorporated or linked to a privacy policy. Table 1 summarizes the extent to which the content of these satisfied predefined privacy policy quality would not be shared with any third party.
After interception and inspection of internet traffic generated by each app, data transmission to 1 or more third parties was identified for 33 of 36 apps (92%) (compared with 12 of 36 [33%] in which data were transmitted to a destination operated by the developer). Google social login was present in 3 apps (8%), while Facebook social login was present in 7 (19%). All apps implementing these social login functions were found to be transmitting weak personal identifiers to Google or Facebook, respectively. Transmissions occurred regardless of whether the social login feature was used. (28) 2 (6) 2 (6) 8 (22) Analytics services 14 (39) 5 (14) 1 (3) 4 (11) Google destinations 13 (36) 5 (14) 3 (8) 7 (19) Google advertising services 
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Discussion
Transmission of data to third-party entities was prevalent, occurring in 33 of 36 top-ranked apps (92%) for depression and smoking cessation, but most apps failed to provide transparent disclosure of such practices. Commonly observed issues included the lack of a written privacy policy, the omission of policy text describing third-party transmission (or for such transmissions to be declared in a nonspecific manner), or a failure to describe the legal jurisdictions that would handle data. In a smaller number of cases, data transmissions were observed that were contrary to the stated privacy policies.
Transmissions to third parties were dominated in this sample by just 2 commercial entities offering advertising and analytics services. While both Google and Facebook require developers to name the use of their services to users, [33] [34] [35] only approximately half of the apps did this in a privacy policy. It may be argued that user interface features, such as a branded social login or advertising content, offer a form of implicit disclosure of data sharing. However, most apps offered users no way to determine in advance that data would be shared with either Google or Facebook and, as a result, users are effectively denied the opportunity to make an informed choice about whether such sharing is acceptable to them. Identification of the possibility of commercial data sharing appears to rely on the technical privacy literacy of users (for example, to understand that the presence of a social login in the user interface may imply that data sharing will occur). However, privacy literacy is known to be variable, 36 and user interface cues were an unreliable proxy for transmission in this sample.
While transmission of directly personally identifiable information was not observed, traffic sent to third parties routinely included linkable information. This included fixed device identifiers on Android (despite these being deprecated on privacy grounds 37 and no longer available to developers of iOS apps 38 ) and advertising identifiers on both platforms (which ostensibly provide greater protection, as they can be reset by the user, but are still designed to allow user tracking across services). The transmission of even basic details, such as the name or category of the app generating traffic, alongside these identifiers potentially enables third parties to generate linkable information about mental health status. The observed consolidation of services offering advertising, marketing, and analytics may exacerbate this risk by increasing the likelihood that a given service provider holds data from multiple sources. While Google explicitly limits the secondary uses of data collected for analytics 33 and advertising or marketing 39 of information provided about data processing jurisdictions observed in this sample suggests that developers may either be unaware of this risk or do not appreciate its significance for potentially sensitive health data.
These dynamic aspects of app privacy underline the need for the clinical community to respond with frequent privacy reviews that incorporate both consideration of privacy policies and technical security reviews. While it is appealing to offer health care consumers metrics such as transparency scores for app privacy policies, our results highlight the need for such metrics to be updated often and include the interrogation of actual app traffic. As demonstrated in this study, such a review is not only possible but also revealing of emerging issues that may influence decision making around use of smartphone apps for health.
Limitations
This study has limitations. As with other studies of health app policy and content, our analysis was conducted using a snapshot of apps and policy documentation captured at a single point. While we recognize that the app marketplaces are a dynamic environment, 40 This analysis examined only the 10 top-ranked apps on each platform, targeting 2 areas: depression and smoking cessation. This represents a small fraction of the pool of available apps for mental health. Although multiple factors are associated with app adoption, 27 search rank appears to be a heuristic strategy by most users when selecting which apps to download. 41 Consequently, when paired with strategies to minimize algorithmic tailoring of search results, highly ranked apps are likely to be representative of those apps installed by users.
Data transmissions were categorized into advertising and marketing vs analytics uses using an existing data-derived schema 6 and based on the web address of the receiving services. The emergence of analytics services consuming advertising identifiers for linking user behavior across multiple services highlights that this categorical distinction may no longer be relevant. Future work should consider collapsing these categories and instead characterizing third-party services by the purposes for which data are used. Categorical analysis of third-party traffic was also limited to the 2 most common traffic destinations, Google (by 28 apps) and Facebook (by 12 apps). The remaining 14 third-party destinations were used by fewer than 5 apps each.
We could only identify transmissions to third parties occurring directly from apps. We cannot rule out the possibility that data sent to developer-run services (observed in 12 of 36 apps [33%]) are subsequently shared with third parties. Our findings may, therefore, be conservative in this regard.
Conclusions
While smartphone apps hold substantial potential to increase access to mental health care, our results highlight deficits in the disclosure of data transmission practices involving third parties.
Mechanisms that potentially enable a small number of dominant online service providers to link information about the use of mental health apps, without either user consent or awareness, appear to be prevalent. Mismatches between declared privacy policies and observed behavior highlight the continuing need for innovation around trust and transparency for health apps. Privacy policy review must be supplemented by sustained technical efforts if new and evolving privacy risks are to be identified in a timely way and flagged effectively to consumers and health care professionals. As smartphones continue to gain capabilities to collect new forms of personal, biometric, and health
